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Abstract
Inequality and its consequences are the subject of intense recent debate. Using
a simplified model of the economy, we address the relation between inequality and
liquidity, the latter understood as the frequency of economic exchanges. Assuming a
Pareto distribution of wealth for the agents, that is consistent with empirical findings,
we find an inverse relation between wealth inequality and overall liquidity. We show
that an increase in the inequality of wealth results in an even sharper concentration
of the liquid financial resources. This leads to a congestion of the flow of goods and
the arrest of the economy when the Pareto exponent reaches one.
1 Introduction
Today’s global economy is more interconnected and complex than ever, and seems out of
any particular institution’s control. The diversity of markets and traded products, the
complexity of their structure and regulation, make it a daunting challenge to understand
behaviours, predict trends or prevent systemic crises. The neo-classical approach, that
aimed at explaining global behaviour in terms of perfectly rational actors, has largely
failed [1, 2, 4]. Yet, persistent statistical regularities in empirical data suggest that a less
ambitious goal of explaining economic phenomena as emergent statistical properties of a
large interacting system may be possible, without requiring much from agents’ rationality
(see e.g. [6, 7]). One of the most robust empirical stylised fact, since the work of Pareto,
is the observation of a broad distribution of wealth which approximately follows a power
law. Such a power law distribution of wealth does not require sophisticated assumptions
on the rationality of players, but it can be reproduced by a plethora of simple models (see
e.g. [14, 15, 16, 17]), in which it emerges as a typical behaviour – i.e. as the behaviour
that the system exhibits with very high probability – within quite generic settings.
The debate on inequality has a long history, dating back at least to the work of Kutznets
[8] on the u-shaped relationship of inequality on development. Much research has focused
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Figure 1: Left: Velocity of money of MZM stocks (right y-axis) and Pareto exponent β
of the wealth distribution (left y-axis) as a function of time. Both time series refer to
the US. The data on the money velocity is retrieved from [5], the data on the wealth
distribution is taken from [13]. Inset: relation between the fraction w> of wealth owned
by the P> percent wealthiest individuals, and P> for the years 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010
(see footnote 1). Right: MZM velocity of money (MZMV, central y-axis) as a function
of β, for the same data. Liquidity, defined as the probability that a unit-money random
exchange takes place, (right y-axis) as a function of β, in the synthetic economy described
by our model (see Eq. 2 and Figure 3 for details on the numerical simulations).
on the relation between inequality and growth (see e.g. [9]). Inequality has also been
suggested to be positively correlated with a number of indicators of social disfunction,
from infant mortality and health to social mobility and crime [10].
The subject has regained much interest recently, in view of the claim that levels of
inequality have reached the same levels as in the beginning of the 20th century [11]. Saez
and Zucman [13] corroborate these findings, studying the evolution of the distribution of
wealth in the US economy over the last century, and they find an increasing concentration
of wealth in the hands of the 0.01% of the richest. Figure 1 shows that the data in Saez
and Zucman [13] is consistent with a power law distribution P{wi > x} ∼ x−β, with
a good agreement down to the 10% of the richest (see caption1). The exponent β has
been steadily decreasing in the last 30 years, reaching the same levels it attained at the
beginning of the 20th century (β = 1.43± 0.01 in 1917).
Rather than focusing on the determinants of inequality, here we focus on a specific
consequence of inequality, i.e. on its impact on liquidity. There are a number of reasons
why this is relevant. First of all, the efficiency of a market economy essentially resides
1 Ref. [13] reports the fraction w> of wealth in the hands of the P> = 10%, 5%, 1%, 0.5%, 0.1% and
0.01% richest individuals. If the fraction of individuals with wealth larger than w is proportional to
P>(w) ∼ w−β , the wealth share w> in the hands of the richest P> percent of the population satisfies
w> ∼ P 1−1/β> (for β > 1). Hence β is estimated from the slope of the relation between logP> and logw>,
shown in the inset of Fig. 1 (left) for a few representative years. The error on β is computed as three
standard deviations in the least square fit.
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on its ability to allow agents to exchange goods. A direct measure of the efficiency is the
number of possible exchanges that can be realised or equivalently the probability that a
random exchange can take place. This probability quantifies the “fluidity” of exchanges
and we shall call it liquidity in what follows. This is the primary measure of efficiency
that we shall focus on. Secondly, liquidity, as intended here, has been the primary concern
of monetary polices such as Quantitative Easing aimed at contrasting deflation and the
slowing down of the economy, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. A quantitative
measure of liquidity is provided by the velocity of money [3], measured as the ratio between
the nominal Gross Domestic Product and the money stock2 and it quantifies how often
a unit of currency changes hand within the economy. As Figure 1 shows, the velocity
of money has been steadily declining in the last decades. This paper suggests that this
decline and the increasing level of inequality are not a coincidence. Rather the former is
a consequence of the latter.
Without clear yardsticks marking levels of inequality that seriously hamper the func-
tioning of an economy, the debate on inequality runs the risk of remaining at a qualitative
or ideological level. Our main finding is that, in the simplified setting of our model, there
is a sharp threshold beyond which inequality becomes intolerable. More precisely, when
the power law exponent of the wealth distribution approaches one from above, liquidity
vanishes and the economy halts because all available (liquid) financial resources concen-
trate in the hands of few agents. This provides a precise, quantitative measure of when
inequality becomes too much.
Our main goal in the present work is thus to isolate the relation between inequality
and liquidity in the simplest possible model that allows us to draw sharp and robust
conclusions. Specifically, the model is based on a simplified trading dynamics in which
agents with a Pareto distributed wealth randomly trade goods of different prices. Agents
receive offers to buy goods and each such transaction is executed if it is compatible with
the budget constraint of the buying agent. This reflects a situation where, at those prices,
agents are indifferent between all feasible allocations. The model is in the spirit of random
exchange models (see e.g. [18, 19]), but our emphasis is not on whether the equilibrium
can be reached or not. In fact we show that the dynamics converges to a steady state,
which corresponds to a maximally entropic state where all feasible allocations occur with
the same probability. Rather we focus on the allocation of cash in the resulting stationary
state and on the liquidity of the economy, defined as the fraction of attempted exchanges
that are successful. We remark that since the wealth distribution is fixed, the causal link
between inequality and liquidity is clear in the simplified setting we consider.
Within our model, the freezing of the economy occurs because when inequality in the
wealth distribution increases, financial resources (i.e. cash) concentrate more and more in
the hands of few agents (the wealthiest), leaving the vast majority without the financial
means to trade. This ultimately suppresses the probability of successful exchanges, i.e.
liquidity (see Figure 1, right).
This paper is organised as follows: we start by describing the model and its basic
characteristics in Section 2, providing a quick overview of the main results and features
of the model in Section 3. In Section 4 we explain in more detail how these features
can be understood by an approximated solution of the Master Equation governing the
trading dynamics. Details on the analytical derivations and Monte Carlo simulations are
thoroughly presented in the appendices. We conclude with some remarks in Section 5.
2We report data on the MZM (money with zero maturity), the broadest definition of money stock that
includes all money market funds. We refer to [5] for further details.
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2 The model
The model consists of N agents, each with wealth ci with i = 1, . . . , N . Agents are allowed
to trade among themselves M objects. Each object m = 1, . . . ,M has a price pim. A given
allocation of goods among the agents is described by an N ×M allocation matrix A with
entries ai,m = 1 if agent i owns good m and zero otherwise. Agents can only own baskets
of goods that they can afford, i.e. whose total value does not exceed their wealth. The
wealth not invested in goods
ci −
M∑
m=1
ai,mpim = `i ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
corresponds to the cash (liquid capital) that agent i has available for trading. The in-
equality `i ≥ 0 for all i indicate that lending is not allowed. Therefore the set of feasible
allocations – those for which `i ≥ 0 for all i – is only a small fraction of the MN conceivable
allocation matrices A.
Starting from a feasible allocation matrix A, we introduce a random trading dynamics
in which a good m is picked uniformly at random among all goods. Its owner then attempts
to sell it to another agent i drawn uniformly at random among the other agents. If agent i
has enough cash to buy the product m, that is if `i ≥ pim, the transaction is successful and
his/her cash decreases by pim while the cash of the seller increases by pim. We do not allow
objects to be divided. Notice that the total capital ci of agents does not change over time,
so ci and the prices pim are parameters of the model. The entries of the allocation matrix,
and consequently the cash, are dynamical variables, which evolve over time according to
this dynamics. This model belongs to the class of zero-intelligent agent-based models, in
the sense that agents do not try to maximize any utility function.
An interesting property of our dynamics is that the stochastic transition matrixW (A →
A′) is symmetric between any two feasible configurations A and A′: W (A → A′) =
W (A′ → A). We note that any feasible allocation A can be reached from any other
feasible allocation A′ by a sequence of trades. This implies that the dynamics satisfies
the detailed balance condition, with a stationary distribution over the space of feasible
configurations that is uniform: P (A) = const. Alternative choices of dynamics which also
fulfil these conditions are explored in appendix A.1.
In particular, we focus on realisations where the wealth ci is drawn from a Pareto
distribution P{ci > c} ∼ c−β, for c > cmin for each agent i. We let β vary to explore
different levels of inequality, and compare different economies in which the ratio between
the total wealth C = ∑i ci and the total value of all objects Π = ∑m pim is kept fixed.
We use C > Π so as to have feasible allocations. We consider cases where the M objects
are divided into a small number K of classes with Mk objects per class (k = 1, . . . ,K);
objects belonging to class k have the same price pi(k). If zi,k is the number of object of
class k that agent i owns, then (1) takes the form ci =
∑K
k=1 zi,kpi(k) + `i.
3 Main results
The main result of this model is that the flow of goods among agents becomes more and
more congested as inequality increases until it halts completely when the Pareto exponent
β tends to one from above.
The origin of this behaviour can be understood in the simplest setting where K = 1,
i.e. all goods have the same price pim = pi(1) = pi (we are going to omit the subscript
(1) in this case). Figure 2 shows the capital composition {(〈z〉i , ci)}Ni=1 for all agents in
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Figure 2: Capital composition in an economy with a single type of good, N = 103 agents,
β = 1.8, M ≈ 2.105 and C/Π = 1.1. Points {(〈z〉i , ci)}Ni=1 denote the average composition
of capital for different agents obtained in Monte Carlo simulations. This is compared with
the analytical solution obtained from the Master Equation (green dashed line) given by
Eq. (6). The vertical dashed line at c(1) ' 7.98 = M/Np(suc)1 indicates the analytically
predicted value of the crossover wealth that separates the two classes of agents. Insets:
cash distributions Pi(`) of the indicated agents.
the stationary state, where 〈z〉i is the average number of goods owned by agent i. The
population of agents separates into two distinct classes: a class of cash-poor agents, who
own an average number of goods that is very close to the maximum allowed by their wealth,
and a cash-rich class, where agents have on average the same number of goods. These two
classes are separated by a sharp crossover region. The inset of Figure 2 shows the cash
distribution Pi(`/pi) (where `/pi = ci/pi − z represents the number of goods they are able
to buy) for some representative agents. While cash-poor agents have a cash distribution
peaked at 0, the wealthiest agents have cash in abundance.
These two observations allow us to trace the origin of the arrest in the economy back
to the shrinkage of the cash-rich class to a vanishingly small fraction of the population, as
β → 1+. As we’ll see in the next section, when β is smaller than 1 the fraction of agents
belonging to this class vanishes as N → ∞. In this regime, not only the wealthiest few
individuals own a finite fraction of the whole economy’s wealth, as observed in Ref. [14],
but they also drain all the financial resources in the economy.
These findings extend to more complex settings. Figure 3 illustrates this for an economy
with K = 10 classes of goods (see figure caption for details) and different values of β.
In order to visualise the freezing of the flow of goods we introduce the success rate of
transactions for goods belonging to class k, denoted as p(suc)k . Figure 3 shows that, as
expected, for a fixed value of the Pareto exponent β the success rate increases as the
goods become cheaper, as they are easier to trade. Secondly it shows that trades of all
classes of goods halt as β tends to unity, that is when wealth inequality becomes too large,
independently of their price.
The decrease of p(suc)k when inequality increases (i.e. as β decreases) is a consequence
of the concentration of cash in the hands of the wealthiest agents. This can be observed
in the right panel of Figure 3, which shows the average cash of agents with a given wealth,
for different values of β. The freezing of the economy when β decreases occurs because
fewer and fewer agents can dispose of enough cash (i.e. have ` > pi(k)) to buy the different
goods (prices pi(k) correspond to the dashed lines).
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Figure 3: Left: Liquidity of goods {p(suc)k }Kk=1 as a function of the inequality exponent
β for a system of N = 105 agents exchanging K = 10 classes of goods (pi(k) = pi(1)gk−1
with g = 1.5, pi(1) = 0.005, Mkpi(k) = Π/K and C/Π = 1.2). Note that all success rates
p
(suc)
k vanish when β → 1+. The curves are ordered from the cheapest (top) to the most
expensive (bottom). The markers are the result of numerical simulations, with error bars
indicating the minimum and maximum values obtained by averaging over 5 realizations
of the wealth allocations (for more details on the simulations see Appendix A.3.1). Right:
for the same simulations with K = 10 classes of goods, we plot the time averaged cash 〈`i〉
as a function of wealth ci, from β = 1.1 to β = 2. The dashed lines indicate the different
prices of goods. Agents with 〈`i〉 below the price of a good typically have not enough cash
to buy it. Cash is proportional to wealth for large levels of wealth (see the upper straight
red dashed line).
Note finally that p(suc)k quantifies liquidity in terms of goods. In order to have an
equivalent measure in terms of cash that can be compared to the velocity of money, we
average pi(k)p
(suc)
k over all goods
p¯(suc) = 1Π
K∑
k=1
Mkpi(k)p
(suc)
k . (2)
This quantifies the frequency with which a unit of cash changes hand in our model economy,
as a result of a successful transaction. It’s behaviour as a function of β for the same
parameters of the economy in Figure 3 is shown in the right panel of Figure 1.
4 The analytical approach to the stationary state
In order to shed light on the findings described above, in this section we describe how to
derive them within an analytic approach. We start by dealing with the simpler case where
all the goods in the system have the same price pim = pi, ∀m (i.e. K = 1).
A formal approach to this problem consists in writing the complete Master Equation
that describes the evolution of the probability P (z1, . . . , zN ) to find the economy in a state
where each agent i = 1, . . . , N has a definite number zi of goods. Taking the sum over all
values of zj for j 6= i, one can derive the Master Equation for a single agent with wealth
ci. The corresponding marginal distribution Pi(z) in the stationary state can be derived
from the detailed balance condition
Pi(z + 1)
z + 1
M
p(suc) = Pi(z)
1
N
(1− δz,mi) , z = 0, 1, . . . ,mi (3)
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where mi = bci/pic is the maximum number of goods which agent i can buy with wealth ci
and p(suc) is the probability that a transaction where agent i sells one good (i.e. z+1→ z)
is successful. Eq. (3) says that, in the stationary state, the probability that agent i has
z objects and buys a new object is equal to the probability to find agent i with z + 1
objects, selling successfully one of them. The factor 1− δz,mi enforces the condition that
agent i can afford at most mi goods and it implies that Pi(z) = 0 for z > mi. Exchanges
are successful if the buyer j does not already have a saturated budget zj = mj . So the
probability p(suc) is also given by
p(suc) = 1− 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
P{zj = mj |zi = z} (4)
∼= 1− 1
N
∑
j
Pj(mj) (N,M  1) (5)
where the last relation holds because when N,M  1 the dependence on z becomes
negligible. This is important, because it implies that for N large the variables zi can be
considered as independent, i.e. P (z1, . . . , zN ) =
∏
i Pi(zi), and the problem can be reduced
to that of computing the marginals Pi(zi) self-consistently.
The solution of Eq. (3) can be written as a truncated Poissonian with parameter
λ = M/(Np(suc))
Pi(z) =
1
Zi
[
λz
z!
]
Θ (mi − z) (6)
with Zi is a normalization factor that can be fixed by
∑
z Pi(z) = 1. Finally, the value of
p(suc) – or equivalently of λ – can be found self-consistently, by solving Eq. (5).
Notice that the most likely value of z for an agent with mi = m is given by
zmode(m) ≡ arg max
z
P (z) =
{
m, if m ≤ λ
λ, if λ ≤ m . (7)
This provides a natural distinction between cash-poor agents – those with m ≤ λ – that
often cannot afford to buy further objects, and cash-rich ones – those with m > λ – who
typically have enough cash to buy further objects.
This separation into two classes of agents was already pointed out in Figure 2. In
terms of wealth, the poor are defined as those with ci < c(1) whereas the rich ones have
ci > c
(1), where the threshold wealth is given by c(1) = λpi = Mpi/(Np(suc)). Notice that
when λ 1, a condition that occurs when the economy is nearly frozen (p(suc)  1), the
distribution Pi(z) is sharply peaked around zmode(m) so that its average is 〈z〉 ' zmode(m).
Then the separation between the two classes becomes rather sharp, as in Figure 2.
In this regime, we can also derive an estimate of p(suc) in the limit N →∞, for β > 1.
Indeed, we have Pi(z = mi) ' 1− miλ +O(λ−2) for λ mi, so a rough estimate of Pj(mj)
is given by Pj(mj) ' max{0, 1 −mj/λ}. Taking the average over agents, as in Eq. (5),
and assuming a distribution density of wealth ρ(c) = βc−β−1 for c ≥ 1 and ρ(c) = 0 for
c < 1, one finds (see Appendix A.2.1)
c(1) '
[
β
(
1− Π
C
)]1/(1−β)
, (8)
p(suc) = M
Nλ
' Π
C
E [c]
c(1)
. (9)
7
Here E [c] = β/(β − 1) is the expected value of the wealth. Notice that E [c] diverges
as β → 1+, but also that within this approximation the threshold wealth c(1) diverges
much faster, with an essential singularity. More precisely, we note that Π/C < 1, so that
β(1−Π/C) ∼ (1−Π/C) is a number smaller than 1 (yet positive). From Eq. (8), we have
c(1) ∼ (1−Π/C)−1/(β−1) →∞. Therefore the liquidity p(suc) vanishes as β → 1+.
For finite N , this approximation breaks down when β gets too close to or smaller than
one. Also, E [c] is ill-defined and in Eq. (9) it should be replaced with 〈c〉 ≡ 1/N∑i ci,
which strongly fluctuates between realizations and depends on N . An estimate of p(suc)
for finite N and β < 1 can be obtained by observing that the wealth c(1) marking the
separation between the two classes cannot be larger than the wealth cmax of the wealthiest
agent. By extreme value theory, the latter is given by cmax ∼ N1/β, with a > 0. Therefore
the solution is characterised by c(1) = piλ ∼ cmax ∼ N1/β. Furthermore, for β < 1
the average wealth is dominated by the wealthiest few, i.e. 〈c〉 ∼ N1/β−1 and therefore
p(suc) ∼ 〈c〉 /c(1) ∼ N−1. In other words, in this limit the cash-rich class is composed of
a finite number of agents, who hold almost all the cash of the economy. Figure 4 (left)
shows that the rough analytical estimate of Eq. (9) is in good agreement with Monte
Carlo simulations.
The analysis carries forward to the general case in which K classes of goods are con-
sidered, starting from the full Master Equation for the joint probability of the ownership
vectors ~zi = (zi,1 . . . , zi,K) for all agents i = 1, . . . , N . For the same reasons as before,
the problem can be reduced to that of computing the marginal distribution Pi(~zi) of a
single agent. The main complication is that the maximum number mi,k of goods of class
k that agent i can get now depends on how many of the other goods agent i owns, i.e.
mi,k(z(k)i ) = b(ci −
∑
k′(6=k) zi,k′pi(k′))/pikc, where z(k)i = {zi,k′}k′(6=k). The detailed balance
condition
Pi(~z + eˆk)
zk + 1
M
p
(suc)
k = Pi(~z)
Mk
M
1
N
(
1− δzk,mi,k(z(k))
)
(10)
again yields the stationary state distribution (for N,M  1). On the left we have the
probability that one of the zk + 1 objects of type k of agent i is picked for a successful sale
(here eˆk is the vector with all zero components and with a kth component equal to one,
and p(suc)k is the probability that a sale of an object of type k is successful). This must
balance the probability (on the r.h.s.) that agent i is selected as the buyer of an object
of type k, which requires that agent i has less than mi,k(z(k)) objects of type k, for the
transaction to occur (here Mk/M is the probability that an object of type k is picked at
random, and 1/N is the probability that agent i is selected as the buyer). It can easily
be checked that the solution to this set of equations is given by a product of Poisson laws
with parameters λk = Mk/(Np(suc)k ), with the constraint Eq. (1),
Pi(z1, ..., zK) =
1
Zi
[
K∏
k=1
λzkk
zk!
]
Θ
(
ci −
K∑
k
zkpi(k)
)
, (11)
with Zi a normalization factor obeying
∑
z1 ...
∑
zK
Pi(z1, ..., zK) = 1. Here the p(suc)k
corresponds to the acceptance rates of transactions of goods of class k and are given by
p
(suc)
k = 1−
1
N
N∑
i=1
P
{
zi,k = mi,k(z(k)i )
}
(12)
As in the case with K = 1, the values of the p(suc)k need to be found self-consistently, which
can be complicated when K and M are large.
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When the total number of objects per agent is large for any class k, we expect that
λ1, ..., λK  1, and then the values of zi,k are close to their expected values. This
implies that the population of agents splits into K classes, where agents with wealth
ci ∈ [c(k−1), c(k)] have their budget saturated with goods of class k′ ≤ k and cannot afford
more expensive objects (here c(k) = λkpi(k), k = 1, . . . ,K and c(0) = cmin). An estimate
for the thresholds c(k) can be derived following the same arguments as for K = 1, by
observing that when analysing the dynamics of goods of type k, all agents in class k′ < k
are effectively frozen and can be neglected. Combining this with the conservation of the
total number of objects of each kind, we obtain a recurrence relation for c(k). We refer the
interested reader to the Appendix A.2.2 for details on the derivation, and report here the
result in the case of goods with pi(k) = pi(1)gk−1, g > 1 large enough, with β > 1 and in
the limit N →∞:
c(k) '
[
βk −
(
β − βk+1
1− β
)
Π
KC
] 1
1−β
, (13)
p
(suc)
k =
Mk
Nλk
' Π
KC
E [c]
c(k)
. (14)
In the limit β → 1+ of large inequality, close inspection3 of Eq. (13) shows that
c(k) →∞, ∀k, which implies that all agents become cash-starved except for the wealthiest
few. Since p(suc)k ∼ E [c] /c(k), this implies that all markets freeze: p(suc)k → 0,∀k. The arrest
of the flow of goods appears to be extremely robust against all choices of the parameter
pi(k), as p
(suc)
1 is an upper bound for the other success rates of transactions p
(suc)
k . These
conclusions are fully consistent with the results of extensive numerical simulations (see
Figure 4 in appendix A.2).
5 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have introduced a zero-intelligence trading dynamics in which agents
have a Pareto distributed wealth and randomly trade goods with different prices. We have
shown that this dynamics leads to a uniform distribution in the space of the allocations
that are compatible with the budget constraints. We have also shown that when the
inequality in the distribution of wealth increases, the economy converges to an equilibrium
where typically (i.e. with probability very close to one) the less wealthy agents have less
and less cash available, as their budget becomes saturated by objects of the cheapest type.
At the same time this class of cash-starved agents takes up a larger and larger fraction of
the economy, thereby leading to a complete halt of the economy when the distribution of
wealth becomes so broad that its expected average diverges (i.e. when β → 1+). In these
cases, a finite number of the wealthiest agents own almost all the cash of the economy.
The model presented in this paper is intentionally simple, so as to highlight a simple,
robust and quantifiable link between inequality and liquidity. In particular, the model
neglects important aspects such as i) agents’ incentives and preferential trading, ii) en-
dogenous price dynamics and iii) credit. It is worth discussing each of these issues in order
to address whether the inclusion of some of these factors would revert our finding that
inequality and liquidity are negatively related.
First, our model assumes that all exchanges that are compatible with budget con-
straints will take place, but in more realistic setting only exchanges that increase each
party’s utility should take place. Yet if the economy freezes in the case where agents
3Note that the term in square brackets is smaller than one, when β → 1+.
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would accept all exchanges that are compatible with their budget, it should also freeze
when only a subset of these exchanges are feasible. Also the model assumes that all agents
trade with the same frequency whereas one might expect that rich agents trade more fre-
quently than poorer ones. Could liquidity be restored if trading patterns exhibit some level
of homophily, with rich people trading more often and preferentially with rich people?
First we note that both these effects are already present in our simple setting. Agents
with higher wealth are selected more frequently as sellers as they own a larger share of the
objects. In spite of the fact that buyers are chosen at random, successful trades occur more
frequently when the buyer is wealthy. So, in the trades actually observed the wealthier do
trade more frequently than the less wealthy, and preferentially with other wealthy agents.
Furthermore, if agents are allowed to trade only with agents having a similar wealth (e.g.
with the q agents immediately wealthier or less wealthy) it is easy to show that detailed
balance still holds with the same uniform distribution on allocations. As long as all the
states are accessible, the stationary probability distribution remains the same4. Therefore,
our conclusions are robust with respect to a wide range of changes in our basic setting
that would account for more realistic trading patterns.
Secondly, it is reasonable to expect that prices will adjust – i.e. deflate – as a result
of a diminished demand caused by the lack of liquidity. Within our model, the inclusion
of price adjustment, occurring on a slower time-scale than trading activity, would reduce
the ratio Π/C (between total value of goods and total wealth), but it would also change
the wealth distribution. Since the freezing phase transition occurs irrespective of the ratio
Π/C, the first effect, though it might alleviate the problem, would not change our main
conclusion. The second would make it more compelling, because cash would not depreciate
as prices do, so deflation would leave wealthy agents – who hold most of the cash – even
richer compared to the cash deprived agents, that would suffer the most from deflation. So
while price adjustment apparently increases liquidity, this may promote further inequality,
that would curtail liquidity further.
Finally, can the liquidity freeze be avoided by allowing agents to borrow? Access to
credit, we believe, will hardly improve the situation5, in line with the results of Ref. [15]
and for similar reasons. Credit may mitigate illiquidity in the short term, but cash deprived
agents should borrow from wealthier ones. With positive interest rates, this would make
inequality even larger in the long run. So credit is likely to make things worse, in line with
the arguments6 in [12].
Therefore, even though the model presented here can be enriched in many ways, we
don’t see a way in which the relation between inequality and liquidity could be reversed.
Corroborating the present model with empirical data goes beyond the scope of the
present paper, yet we remark that our findings are consistent with the recent economic
trends, as shown in Figure 1. For example, it is worth observing that, alongside with
4The dynamics changes and thus p(suc)k changes, in particular for goods more expensive than pi(1), the
seller is typically cash-rich and thus its neighbours are too. This can induce to have a liquidity of expensive
goods higher than that of cheaper ones. However in the limit β → 1+, it is still true that cash concentrates
in the hands of a vanishing fraction of agents, and there is still a freeze of the economy.
5Allowing agents to borrow using goods as collaterals is equivalent to doubling the wealth of cash-
starved agents, provided that any good can be used only once as a collateral, and that goods bought with
credit cannot themselves be used as collaterals. This would at most blur the crossover between cash-rich
agents and cash-starved ones, as intermediate agents would sometimes use credit. This does not change
our main conclusion that inequality and liquidity are inversely related and that the economy would halt
when β → 1+.
6Piketty [12] observes that when the rate of return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy
(which is zero in our setting), wealth concentrates more in the hands of the rich.
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increasing levels of inequality, trade has slowed down after the 2008 crisis7. More generally,
avoiding deflation -or promoting inflation- has been a major target of monetary policies
after 2008, which one could take as an indirect evidence of the slowing down of the economy.
Furthermore, the fact that inequality hampers liquidity and hence promotes demand for
credit suggests that the boom in credit market before 2008 and the increasing levels of
inequality might not have been a coincidence.
An interesting side note is that the concentration of capital in the top agents goes hand
in hand with a flow of cash to the top. Indeed, in our model an injection of extra capital in
the lower part of the wealth pyramid –the so-called helicopter money policy– is necessarily
followed by a flow of this extra cash to the top, via many intermediate agents, thus
generating many transactions on the way. This trickle up dynamics should be contrasted
with the usual idea of the trickle down policy, which advocates injections of money to the
top in order to boost investment. In this respect, it is tempting to relate our findings
to the recent debate on Quantitative Easing measures, and in particular to the proposal
that the (European) central bank should finance households (or small businesses) rather
than financial institutions in order to stimulate the economy and raise inflation [20, 21].
Clearly, our results support the helicopter money policy, because injecting cash at the top
does not disengages the economy from a liquidity stall.
Extending our minimal model to take into account the endogenous dynamics of the
wealth distribution and of prices, accounting for investment and credit, is an interesting
avenue of future research, for which the present work sets the stage. In particular, this
could shed light on understanding the conditions under which the positive feedback be-
tween returns on investment and inequality, that lies at the very core of the dynamics
which has produced ever increasing levels of inequality according to [11, 12, 13], sets in.
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A Appendix
A.1 About the Rules Providing Detailed Balance
The detailed balance condition is a useful criterium to find the stationary state in stochastic
processes. Given a dynamics formulated in terms of the transition ratesW (Ai,Aj) between
configurations Ai and Aj , If one can find a measure P (Ai) ≥ 0 over configurations that
satisfies the detailed balance condition
∀i, j, W (Ai,Aj)P (Ai) = W (Aj ,Ai)P (Aj), (15)
and if the system is ergodic8, then P (Ai) is the unique stationary distribution. The
detailed balance property corresponds to a local balance of the flux between any pair of
configurations.
The simplest way to have detailed balance property is to use symmetrical transfer rates:
W (Ai,Aj) = W (Aj ,Ai). In that case, one automatically gets a uniform distribution over
the space of configurations: P (A) = const, ∀A. The flux W (A1,A2)P (A1) is then also
uniform. It is clear that the dynamics defined in this paper has this property, because for
any two configurations that differs by the ownership of one object, the rate of the process
linking them is equal to 1/(NM) in both directions.
What about the rules providing detailed balance, but without symmetry of the rates?
In that case, one would need to explicitly find the probability density over the configu-
rations. Since the resulting density would be non-uniform, it would be more difficult to
link dynamical observables (rate of money transfer, etc.) to static variables (number of
neighbouring configuration to a given configuration). We do not explore these cases.
What are the rules that give symmetrical transfer rates? We define time such that
at each time step, a single object is picked and there is a single attempt at selling it to
another agent (not the current owner). In this paper, we consider the simplest case where
objects are picked independently of their price9. This still leaves us several choices. There
are N − 1 rules which yield symmeteric rates (and thus respect detailed balance). The
generic case is the following, with 2 ≤ n ≤ N :
• rule #n: The integer n is fixed. Select n distinct agents at random. Select one object
among the set of all the objects they (collectively) own. This object will be sold (if
possible) by the owner to a randomly selected agent among the n − 1 remaining
agents in the set of selected agents.
This generic rule is a bit cryptic, but has two particular cases that are clearer:
• rule #2: Select two distinct agents at random. Select one object among the set of
all the objects they (collectively) own. This object is sold (if possible) by the owner
to the other agent.
• rule #N : Pick an object at random. The owner is then the seller. Select a buyer at
random amongst the N − 1 remaining agents.
Note that the rule #n = 1 does not make sense, so that there are indeed N − 1 different
rules. In this paper, we always use the rule #N , i.e. simply pick the object at random.
8Meaning that for each pair of configurations Ai and Aj there is a path of a finite number of intermediate
configurations Aik with non-zero rate W (Aik ,Aik+1),
9One could pick an object with a rate proportional to its value. This kind of choice would still give
the same phase space and thus the same probability distribution over microstates, but the dynamics could
become very different in terms of the speed of transactions, in particular it could fluctuate much more.
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As all these rules produce an ergodic dynamics, and since the probability distribution of
configurations is the same for all rules (it is P (A) = const.), it does not matter at all
which of these dynamical rules we picked.
We do not claim that these rules are the only ones providing symmetric rates, or even
that this property is necessary for interesting dynamics. We simply point out that the
detail of the choice of the dynamical rule is not crucial, as long as we as we have a simple
zero-intelligent dynamics which generates symmetric transition rates. We now give a few
examples of rules that are either identical to those above, or do not yield symmetrical
probabilities of transfer:
• Select one seller among the N agents by using weighted probabilities: each agent i
is affected a weight no where no is the number of objects owned by agent i. Pick
an object from this agent at random. It will be sold to an agent picked uniformly
among the N − 1 remaining agents. This rule is actually exactly the rule #N .
• The following rule does not yield symmetrical probabilities of transfer: select a buyer
at random. Select any object not already owned by him at random. The owner of
that object sells it to the buyer. The problem is that if the buyer has more objects
than the seller, the inverse transaction has smaller probability to occur than the
direct one.
• The following rule very clearly breaks symmetry: select one seller at random. Select
an object in his set at random. Select a buyer among the N − 1 remaining agents
at random. Naively, this rule could be named #1, but it clearly breaks symmetry.
(The transaction from a hoarder to an agent with few objects has much smaller
probability to occur than the inverse transaction.)
A.2 Computation of p(suc)k in the large λ limit
A.2.1 Derivation of p(suc) and c(1) in the large λ limit for 1 type of good.
As discussed in the main text, we can compute p(suc) using
p(suc) = 1− 1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(z = mi) (16)
approximating the probability to be on a threshold Pi(z = mi) by
Pi(z = mi) =
{(
1− miλ
)
for mi  λ
0 for mi > λ
. (17)
The first case can be understood by noting that
Pi(z = mi) =
λmi 1mi!∑mi
x=0 λ
x 1
x!
= 1
1 + miλ +
mi(mi−1)
λ2 + . . .
'
(
1− mi
λ
)
, (18)
where the approximation is valid in the limit mi  λ. Assuming this approximation to
be valid in all the range mi < λ is clearly a bad assumption for all agents with mi close to
λ. However the wealth is power law distributed, and so the weight of agents with mi ∼ λ
is negligible in the sum over all agents, Eq. (16). The accuracy of this approximation
increases when the exponent of the power law β decreases.
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Then p(suc) can be computed using
p(suc) = 1− 1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(z = mi) ' 1−
∫ c(1)=λpi
1
dc βc−β−1
(
1− c
λpi
)
. (19)
This is an implicit expression for p(suc), since it appears on the l.h.s. of the equation and
also on the r.h.s. (because λ = M
Np(suc)
).
When β > 1 this expression can be expressed to be realization-independent, using
p(suc) = M
Nλ
= Π
C
E [c]
c(1)
, (20)
where E [c] = β/(β − 1) is the expected value of the wealth per agent. We also use the
fact that we fill in the system a number M of goods in such a way to have a fixed ratio
Π/C. Performing the integral on the r.h.s of Eq. (19) gives an equation for c(1):
Π
C
E [c]
c(1)
= c(1)−β
( 1
1− β
)
− β1− β
1
c(1)
, (21)
that simplifies into:
c(1) =
[
β
(
1− Π
C
)]1/(1−β)
. (22)
A.2.2 Derivation of p(suc)k and c(k) in the large λ limit for several types of good.
An analytic derivation for the p(suc)k and c(k) can be obtained also for the cases of several
goods, but only in the limit in which prices are well separated (i.e. pi(k+1)  pi(k)) and
the total values of good of any class is approximately constant (we use Mkpi(k) = Π/K =
const). In this limit we expect to find a sharp separation of the population of agents into
classes. This is because M1  M2  . . .  MK implies that the market is flooded with
objects of the class 1, which constantly change hands and essentially follow the laws found
in the single type of object case. On top of this dense gas of objects of class 1, we can
consider objects of class 2 as a perturbation (they are picked M2/M1 times less often!).
On the time scale of the dynamics of objects of type 2, the distribution of cash is such that
all agents with a wealth less than c(1) = pi(1)λ1 have their budget saturated by objects of
type 1 and typically do not have enough cash to buy objects of type 2 nor more expensive
ones. Likewise, there is a class of agents with c(1) < ci ≤ c(2) that will manage to afford
goods of types 1 and 2, but will hardly ever hold goods more expensive that pi(2).
In brief, the economy is segmented into K classes, with class k composed of all agents
with ci ∈ [c(k), c(k+1)) who can afford objects of class up to k, but who are excluded from
markets for more expensive goods, because they rarely have enough cash to buy goods
more expensive than pi(k). This structure into classes can be read off from Figure 3, where
we present the average cash of agents, given their cash in a specific case (see caption).
The horizontal lines denote the prices pi(k) of the different objects, and the intersections
with the horizontal lines define the thresholds c(k). Agents that have ci just above c(k) are
cash-filled in terms of object of class k, but are cash-starved in terms of objects pi(k′), k′ > k.
The liquidities p(suc) can be given by the following expression
p
(suc)
k = 1−
1
N
N∑
i=1
P
{
zi,k = mi,k(z(k)i )
}
= 1− 1
N
N∑
i=1
Pi(not accepting good type k) (23)
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Figure 4: Success probability of transaction p(suc)k as a function of the Pareto exponent β.
Comparison between numerical simulations and analytical estimates for one class of goods
(left panel) and two classes of goods (right panel). The blue solid circles are the result of
Monte Carlo simulations performed for N = 105 agents and averaged over 5 realizations.
Here the error bars indicate the min and max value of p(suc)k over all realizations (we
used the “adjusted Pareto” law for the right panel, see Appendix A.3.1). The red lines
are the analytic estimates according to Eq. (9) and Eq. (13) for left and right panels,
respectively. The green crossed lines correspond to numerically (see Appendix A.3.2)
solving the analytical solution (11) for a population composed of N = 64 (kind of) agents.
According to the previous discussion of segmentation of the system into K classes, and
using the same approximation for this threshold probability discussed in the case of 1 type
of good, we assume
Pi(not accepting good type k) =

1 for mi < λk−1(
1− miλk
)
for λk−1 < mi < λk
0 for mi > λk
, (24)
Then
p
(suc)
k ' 1−
∫ c(k−1)
1
dc βc−β−1 −
∫ c(k)
c(k−1)
dc βc−β−1
(
1− c
c(k)
)
(25)
In this case now we have
p
(suc)
k =
Mk
Nλk
= Π
KC
E [c]
c(k)
(26)
With similar calculations to the ones showed for the previous case, one can easily get to
the recurrence relation:
c(k) =
[
β
(
c(k−1)
)1−β − β Π
KC
] 1
1−β
. (27)
Iterating, we explicit this into:
c(k) =
[
βk −
(
β − βk+1
1− β
)
Π
KC
] 1
1−β
, (28)
A comparison between the analytical estimate and numerical simulations, presented in
Figure 4, shows that this approximation provides an accurate description of the collective
behaviour of the model.
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Figure 5: Gini coefficient G` of the cash distribution (liquid capital) in the stationary
state of the model as a function of the Gini Gc of the wealth distribution. The dashed line
indicates proportionality between cash and wealth, in which case the inequality in both
is exactly the same. The wealth follows a Pareto distribution with exponent β that tunes
the degree of inequality (the higher is β, the more egalitarian the distribution).
See also in Fig. 5 how the liquidity over-concentrates (with respect to capital con-
centration). There, we compare the liquid and capital concentrations, measured via their
Gini coefficients, for various values of β in the system of Fig. 3 (K = 10, g = 1.5, pi(1) =
0.001, C/Π = 1.2). In particular, note that the limit β → 1+ is singular, as G` reaches
one around β = 1.1, with smaller β yielding also G` ≈ 1. This is an alternative way to see
how the concentration of capital generates an over-concentration of liquidities.
A.3 Details on the numerical methods
A.3.1 Monte-Carlo Simulations
We perform our Monte Carlo simulations of the trading market for N = 105 agents. Prices
generally start from pi(1) and increase by a factor g between each good class. The minimal
wealth is cmin = 1. The ratio C/Π is fixed as indicated in captions, and most importantly
is kept constant between different realizations. As the total wealth fluctuates, so does the
total number of goods.
There are no peculiar difficulties with the numerical method (apart from the large
fluctuations in the average wealth, addressed below). The only thing one has to be careful
with is to ensure that the stationary state has been reached, i.e. that all observables have
a stationary value, an indication that the (peculiar) initial condition has been completely
forgotten. The codes for this Monte Carlo simulation are available online [22].
Adjusted Pareto Wealth Distribution For K ≥ 2 we have predictions for the β ∼ 1
regime, in which the average wealth is particularly fluctuating from realization to real-
ization. Because the value of E [c] controls the number M of objects introduced in the
market, this in turns produces large fluctuations in the values of the p(suc)k which can make
it difficult to have robust results.
More importantly, the typical value of the (empirical) average wealth 〈c〉 is usually quite
different from its expectation value E [c]. This effect is well known and well documented for
power laws, but we present a concrete example of it in Figure 6 to emphasize its intensity.
For the sample size that is typically manageable in our simulations, i.e. N = 105, the
typical value for the average value of the wealth (using e.g. β = 1.1) is of the order of the
17
Figure 6: Distribution of the average 〈c〉j of power laws depending on their sample size N
(from top to bottom, N = 106, 105, 104, 103, 102) for 1000 realizations each (j = 1, ..., 1000),
using an exponent β = 1.1. The dashed line indicates the expectation value E [c] =
cminβ/(β − 1). We see that even for huge samples, the typical 〈c〉j ’s are significantly
smaller than the expected E [c].
half of its expected value: 〈c〉 ≈ 7 ≈ E [c] /2. This indicates that N = 105 is (by far) an
insufficient size to correctly sample a power-law with exponent β = 1.1.
To circumvent this problem, we introduce the “adjusted” Pareto distribution. The idea
is to draw numbers from a power law distribution as usual, and then to adjust the value
of a few of them so that the empirical average matches the expected one. The algorithm
is the following: Start from a true random Pareto distribution.
• if 〈c〉 < E [c], we select an agent at random and increase its wealth until we have
exactly 〈c〉 = E [c].
• if 〈c〉 > E [c], we select the wealthiest agent and decrease its wealth until we have
exactly 〈c〉 = E [c], or until its wealth becomes cmin. If we reach the latter case (it is
quite unlikely), then we perform the same operation on the second-wealthiest agent,
and so on until 〈c〉 = E [c].
As can be seen in Figure 6, the most common case is the first one. The corresponding
adjustment is equivalent to re-drawing the wealth of a single agent until it is such that
〈c〉 = E [c]. This is a weak deviation from a true Pareto distribution. The second case is
more rare, and mostly consists also in a correction on the wealth of a single agent.
This change in the wealth distribution is very efficient at reducing the variability be-
tween different realizations of the same β value. Furthermore it ensures that we can
compare our numerical results at finite N with the predictions that implicitly assume
N = ∞, since we now have 〈c〉 = E [c]. It is quite crucial to use this “adjusted” Pareto
law for the small β’s (i.e. for β ≤ 1.3). See Figure 7 to have an idea of what this modified
distribution means: the only changes in the two sample shown would be in the values of
the wealthiest agent.
A.3.2 Algorithm computing self-consistent solution p(suc), Z(ci)
Here we describe the algorithm used to converge to a self-consistent set of values for
{p(suc)1 , p(suc)2 , Z(c1), ..., Z(cN )}, i.e. solving Eq. (12) for K = 2 (or more simply Eq. (5)
in the case of a single type of goods). It can be generalized straightforwardly to K > 2,
although it may become numerically extremely expensive (see also our code, [22]). The
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Figure 7: Different instances and representation of power-law distributed wealth (or
“Pareto distribution”). Blue and pale blue circles are two realisations for N = 104 agents,
green crosses are an example of staircase-like distribution (a useful approximation of a
Pareto law that we use elsewhere) and the black dashed line is the law itself (blue dots
converge to it in the N → ∞ limit). Left: Probability distribution, with shifts up and
down for clarity (i.e., it is not normalized) Right: wealth ci of each agent, sorted by the
rank i. Note that the wealth of the wealthiest agents (low rank) fluctuates a lot from
realization to realization.
results (green crosses) presented in Figure 4 were obtained using the method described
here.
For each agent there is a constant Z(ci) to be determined self-consistently. This
presents a technical difficulty, as for a true power-law distribution, each agent gets a
different wealth and thus the number of constants to compute is N .
Staircase-like distribution of wealth (with exponent β) A way to tackle this
difficulty is to consider a staircase-like distribution of wealth, where agents are distributed
in groups with homogeneous wealth cg and where the number of agents per group is Ng ∼∫ cg+1
cg
ρ(c)dc, so that individual agents approximately follow a power law with exponent
β. See Figure 7 (green crosses) to have an idea of what this modified distribution means
concretely. This kind of staircase distribution is not a true power-law, in particular because
its maximum is always deterministic and finite. However, as we now have 1 < N  N ,
we can numerically solve the N + 1 equations and thus find the exact value of p(suc). Of
course, the value of p(suc) found in this way perfectly matches with Monte Carlo results
if and only if we use the exact same distribution of wealth and goods in the simulation.
This is not surprising at all, and merely validates our iterative scheme.
However, we note that staircase-like wealth distributions turn out to be very good
approximations of true power laws, when the wealth levels cg are sufficiently refined and
the number of classes N sufficiently large. In particular, using cg = bg with a base b ≈ 1+,
it can be seen that for large enough N , the average wealth 〈c〉 converges to a value very
close to the expected one E [c] (and no longer depends onN ). For large β, typically β ≥ 1.5,
convergence is reached rather fast (N ≥ 50 is enough), and the iterative method can be
used (see for instance Figure 8a). Under these conditions, the observables (e.g. p(suc))
have the same values for a true power law and the corresponding staircase-distribution
(see Figure 8b). However for smaller values of β, convergence is very slow and one needs
at least N > 200 to converge (see Figure 8c). The maximum wealth is then very large,
which makes the iterative method useless for practical purposes (overflow errors arise, and
the number of terms in the sums to be computed explodes exponentially, along with the
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8: (a): Average wealth 〈c〉 dependence on N for a staircase distribution, using
β = 2 and b = 1.1. Black dots: average computed (exactly) for the staircase distribution.
Dashed black: expectation value for the corresponding true power law. Convergence is
reached as soon as N ≈ 50.
(b): Dependence on N of the p(suc)1 computed from the iterative method, using a staircase-
like distribution of wealth (green crosses). As soon as N > 50, it approaches its “true”
value, i.e. the value obtained for a true power-law with exponent β = 2 (dashed blue line).
We used b = 1.1.
(c): Average wealth 〈c〉 dependence on N for a staircase distribution, using β = 1.1 and
b = 1.1. Black dots: average computed (exactly) for the staircase distribution. Dashed
black: expectation value for the corresponding true power law. It takes very large N to
converge.
computational cost).
The algorithm See also our Mathematica code, [22]. The idea is the following. We
define “old” and “new” values for each of the variables Z(c1), ..., Z(cN ) and for Z =∑
i Z(ci). For p
(suc)
1 , p
(suc)
2 , we define only the “current” values, and have “target” values.
We start with an initial guess, e.g. that all the p(suc) = 0.5 and Zold = 1 (which is not
consistent, of course). Then we use the new values of the p(suc) to compute the new
normalization factors. These are used to compute the “target” p(suc), i.e. to know if the
p(suc) should be increased or decreased. New values of p(suc) are again used to recompute
the normalizations, and so forth.
To be more precise, here is the pseudo code we used. We start with some guess values
for the p(suc), e.g. 0.5. Let the variables ∆p(suc)1 ,∆p
(suc)
2 be set to 0.1. The function
P old(z1, z2|ci) uses Zold as normalization factor, and the current values of the p(suc) (since
the term λk = Mk/(Np(suc)k ) is ubiquitous in the expression of P ).
• Compute the new Z(c1), ..., Z(cN ) using the p(suc)k : Znew(ci) =
∑
z1
∑
z2 P (z1, z2|ci)
• Compute Znew = ∑i Znew(ci).
• Set Zold = Zold ∗ Znew.
• Compute the target values of the p(suc):
(p(suc)1 )goal =
N∑
i
Ni
N
− Ni
N
 Znew
Znew(ci)
bci/pi2c∑
z2=0
P (z1 = b(ci − z2pi2)/pi1c, z2|ci)

(29)
and symmetrically for (p(suc)2 )goal.
• For each k, compute σk = sign[((p(suc)k )goal − p(suc)k )∆p(suc)k ].
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• For each k, If σk < 0, set ∆p(suc)k to −∆p(suc)k /2.
• For each k, set p(suc)k to p
(suc)
k + ∆p
(suc)
k .
• If the p(suc) obtained is smaller than 0, set it to |∆p(suc)k | and divide ∆p(suc)k by 2.
• If the p(suc) obtained is larger than 1, set it to 1.
• Loop until all the ∆p(suc)k are smaller than the predefined allowed error and/or the
Znew is close enough to 1.
This algorithm converges to the true value of the p(suc) for large enough N .
Typically, the N that is sufficient to achieve a reasonable approximated convergence
can be estimated by taking a quick look at how much the 〈c〉 (N ) is close to the E [c].
Running this algorithm at different values of N , one can directly probe the convergence:
when increasing N does not change the values of the p(suc) more than the errorbar allowed,
then one considers the method to have converged. In practice, it is fairly fast to converge
for large β’s, and the number of operations exponentially explodes as β is decreased towards
1.
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